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Abstract 
 
In two earlier works (Balashov, 2000a and 2000b), I have argued that considerations 
based on special relativity and the notion of coexistence favor the perdurance view of 
persistence over its endurance rival.  Cody Gilmore (2002) has subjected my argument to 
an insightful three-fold critique.  In the first part of this paper I respond briefly to 
Gilmore’s first two objections.  I then grant his observation that anyone who can resist 
the first objection is liable to succumb to the third one.  This, however, opens a way to 
other closely related relativistic arguments against endurantism that are immune to all 
three objections and, in addition, throw new light on a number of important issues in the 
ontology of persistence.  I develop two such novel arguments in the second half of the 
paper. 
 
 
0.  Introduction 
 
The impact of relativity theory on the metaphysical debate about persistence over time 
has drawn well-deserved attention lately.1  In two earlier works (Balashov, 2000a and 
2000b), I have argued that considerations based on special relativity (SR) and the notion 
of coexistence favor the perdurance view of persistence over its endurance rival.  In a 
recent paper, Cody Gilmore (2002) has offered three objections to my argument.  I begin 
by responding briefly to the first two objections.  I then concede Gilmore’s point that 
resisting the first objection significantly weakens one’s position vis-à-vis the third one.  
At that juncture, however, the dialectic of the dispute suggests two stronger relativistic 
 
1 See Rea, 1998; Balashov, 1999, 2000a, 2000b, 2000c, 2002, 2003; Sider, 2001, Section 4.4; 
Hudson, 2002, 2003; Hales and Johnson, 2003. 
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arguments favoring perdurantism over endurantism, which prevail over the disjunction of 
all three objections. 
Since Gilmore’s reconstruction of my original argument is remarkably clear and 
serves so well to highlight the points of his criticism, I take the liberty to use it in 
rehearsing the argument below.  Space constraints prevent me from addressing all the 
points he has raised (this will have to await a more comprehensive treatment).  
Accordingly, I focus on the tension between two separate components of my view, which 
Gilmore has brought to light, and suggest a way of overcoming it.  This serves to 
strengthen my case and advance the discussion of rival theories of persistence in the 
context of SR. 
 
 
1.  Background and Preliminaries 
 
1.1.  Doing it the hard way.  This debate presupposes eternalism—the view that 
all spacetime regions and their occupants have the same ontological status—and rejects 
the link between endurantism and presentism.  To show that SR favors perdurantism over 
endurantism, it is not enough to show that SR rules out presentism; one has to produce an 
independent argument. 
1.2.  Idealization.  We assume that enduring and perduring material objects do not 
have spatial extension.  Nothing of substance turns on this idealization. 
1.3.  Spatiotemporal locations of persisting objects.  A four-dimensional perdur-
ing object, on this assumption, exactly occupies a distinct worldline, and a momentary 
part of such an object occupies a single spacetime point.  An enduring object, on the 
contrary, typically occupies multiple spacetime points at different moments of its career, 
which could be indexed by the common absolute time in the classical case or by the 
proper time of the object in question in the relativistic case. 
1.4.  Coexistence.  Both endurantism and perdurantism must incorporate an inte-
resting—neither empty nor universal—notion (or notions) of coexistence.  On anyone’s 
view, there must be a sense of the coexistence relation such that I bear this relation to 
George W. Bush but not to Napoleon.  This much I take to be uncontroversial.  What is 
controversial (and Gilmore’s paper makes it very clear) is the link between this notion 
and that of existence.  I return to this point in Section 3. 
I believe (but Gilmore does not; see Section 2 for his objections to this thesis and 
my reply) that coexistence of two arbitrary enduring or perduring objects must be 
grounded in an objective relation between their spatiotemporal locations.  Such a relation 
defines the basic notion of coexistence (BASC), which, in turn, gives rise to a family of 
derivative notions, some familiar some new.  For enduring objects, the basic notion, 
BASC-E, is a four-place relation involving two objects E1 and E2 and their respective 
spatiotemporal locations O1 and O2.  BASC-E obtains just in case E1 and E2 are wholly 
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present at (WP@) O1 and O2 respectively and the relevant two-place relation R holds 
between spacetime points O1 and O2: 
 
BASC-E(E1,E2,O1,O2) ↔ E1 WP@ O1 & E2 WP@ O2 & R(O1,O2) 
 
The nature of R is determined by a particular spacetime theory.  In the classical 
framework, this relation is, informally, that of absolute simultaneity and can be defined 
(informally) as follows: 
 
RN(O1,O2) =df (∃t)(O1∈HPSt & O2∈HPSt) 
 
Here HPSt is the hyperplane of simultaneity corresponding to time t in some inertial 
frame and the subscript ‘N’ stands for ‘neo-Newtonian’.  On BASC-EN, then, two 
enduring objects coexist just in case their momentary locations are contemporaneous, or 
co-present.  Such locations can be conveniently individuated by dates or, in some cases, 
by the ages of the objects in question.  The 51-year old president Putin coexists, in the 
basic sense of BASC-EN, with the 57-year-old president Bush, but not with the 55-year-
old Bush.  Alternatively (if less elegantly), Putin, when he is wholly present at some 
moment in 2004, coexists with Bush, when he is wholly present at the same moment, but 
not when Bush is wholly present at some moment in 2002.  Admittedly, BASC-E is a 
theoretical concept that is at some remove from more intuitive notions.  But it enjoys the 
sort of generality allowing it to serve as a common ground for various such notions.  (It is 
similar, in this respect, to the concept of spatial location, which is normally taken to be 
fundamental; more empirical notions such as distance, angles in space, and so on can then 
be defined on its basis.)  For example, a more recognizable triadic relation ‘E1 coexists 
with E2 at t’ can be defined, classically, as ‘(∃O1,O2) (E1 WP@ O1 & E2 WP@ O2 & 
O1,O2∈HPSt)’.  Putin and Bush coexist, in this sense, in 1955 but not in 1950.  Similarly, 
the dyadic relation ‘E1 coexists with E2’ obtains between two enduring objects just in 
case they ‘overlap’ temporally: (∃O1,O2) (∃t) (E1 WP@ O1 & E2 WP@ O2 & O1,O2∈HPSt).  
Putin coexists, in this sense, with Bush but not with Napoleon.  Below I allow myself the 
liberty to use these different relations of coexistence without explicitly noting their 
adicity where context makes it clear which notion is at work. 
 What about perduring objects?  The ground-level notion of coexistence appropri-
ate for them is the dyadic relation BASC-P between the locations of their momentary 
temporal parts: 
 
BASC-P(P1O1,P2O2) ↔ R(O1,O2) 
 
Here ‘P1O1’ and ‘P2O2’ denote momentary temporal parts of perduring objects P1 and P2 
located at O1 and O2 respectively.  But the perdurantist may also be interested in 
derivative relations of coexistence, such as that between a temporal part of P1 (say, P1O1) 
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and P2 taken as a whole, which obtains iff P2 has a temporal part related to P1O1 by 
BASC-P, or the relation of temporal ‘overlap’ holding between two four-dimensional 
objects just in case they have temporal parts related by BASC-P. 
1.5.  Coexistence and temporal modification.  The endurantist notions of coexist-
ence are temporally qualified in a way the corresponding perdurantist notions are not.  In 
Gilmore’s words, “for the endurantist, all coexistence is coexistence at; and for the 
perdurantist, all coexistence is coexistence simpliciter” (2002, p. 250).  Indeed, BASC-E 
is a tetradic relation involving two objects and two temporal modifiers: spatiotemporal 
locations or, alternatively, dates, proper times or ages of the objects in question.  Thus I at 
1961 coexist, in the basic sense, with JFK at 1961.  This serves to ground a more familiar 
sense in which I coexisted with JFK in 1961—when we were both fully present at a 
certain moment in 1961—but do so no longer.  The perdurantist notions of coexistence 
originating from BASC-P are, on the contrary, dyadic and free of temporal modification.  
They are also free of temporal connotations (or so I argue below).  It would be entirely 
inappropriate to say that my 1961 part used to coexist with (the relevant part of) JFK but 
does so no longer.  Nor would it be strictly appropriate to say that my entire four-
dimensional worldworm used to do so.  More on this below. 
1.6.  Coexistence in Minkowski spacetime.  In classical spacetime coexistence and 
its derivatives introduced above are based on the notion of co-presence at a single 
moment of absolute time.  This notion is not available in SR.  In Balashov, 2000a and 
2000b, I have argued that the best candidate to ground coexistence in Minkowski 
spacetime is the invariant relation of spacelike separation between momentary locations 
of enduring objects, or of parts of perduring objects: 
 
RM(O1,O2) =df η(O1,O2)<0, 
 
where 212
2
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2
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2
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2 )()()()( zzyyxxttc −−−−−−−≡η  is the Minkowski interval.  
Following Gilmore, let me refer to this general proposal as CASS (Coexistence As 
Spacelike Separation). 
CASS emerges as the best candidate for a number of reasons (see Balashov, 
2000a, pp. 132–152).  Here I wish to note that, once we settle on Objectivity (see below), 
the range of choices becomes rather limited, for the relevant relation has to be based on 
the invariant structures of Minkowski spacetime.  Spacelike separation then appears to be 
the most plausible option, which also correctly recovers the classical limit (i.e., the notion 
of co-presence at a moment of absolute time).  But there is a more general worry about 
spacelike separation as the ground of an interesting notion of coexistence.  Given the lack 
of causal connectability between spacelike separated events, does this relation have any 
ontological ‘oomph’?  And what does it have to do with the commonsense notion of 
coexistence, which appears to be based on the presence of extensive causal transactions 
between coexisting entities, such as you and me?  I acknowledge that CASS is somewhat 
removed from the everyday notion, but I maintain that it has strong theoretical 
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credentials.  Looking at a distant star and realizing that the light one is now perceiving 
was emitted thousands of years earlier, it is perfectly reasonable to ask if the star still 
exists.  True, the question has some classical overtones.  But clearly, what drives it is a 
well-placed concern about a relation between causally unconnected items, a relation in 
the ballpark of CASS.2 
It is also clear that, under the assumption that causal interactions cannot propagate 
faster than a certain limit, the issue of causal connectability cuts across the classical-
relativistic distinction.  In particular, the items related by the classical limit of CASS are 
causally disconnected.  But such items belong to the common classical ‘present’.  Indeed, 
they exhaust what there is for the presentist, who will be happy to add that all such items 
coexist.  This is not to endorse presentism, but only to indicate that causal connectability 
and coexistence are conceptually distinct and may go their separate ways. 
CASS gives rise to the following relativistic analogs of the classical accounts of 
coexistence. 
 
(CE) Two enduring objects E1 and E2, located at spacetime points O1 and O2 
respectively, coexist iff O1 and O2 are spacelike separated: 
CE(E1,O1,E2,O2) =df BASC-EM(E1,E2,O1,O2). 
(CP) Two momentary temporal parts of perduring objects coexist iff their 
locations are spacelike separated: CP(P1O1,P2O2) =df BASC-PM(P1O1,P2O2). 
 
Just like BASC-EN, its relativistic counterpart can be used to define derivative notions of 
coexistence, such as that between E1 located at O1 and E2 taken in abstraction from its 
spacetime location, as well as the notion of relativistic ‘temporal overlap’.  Similarly for 
BASC-PM. 
Before endorsing CASS, I had considered several other candidates and had shown 
that they fail to meet certain requirements one can impose on the notion of coexistence, 
the most important of them being Objectivity: 
 
(Objectivity) Given two objects, or their momentary temporal parts, having 
determinate locations in spacetime, there must be a fact of the 
matter about their coexistence. 
 
This brings me to the first point of Gilmore’s critique. 
 
 
2 See Sections 3, 6.3, 6.4, and 7 for detailed discussions of the conceptual link between 
Coexistence and what I call Existence@. 
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2.  Gilmore’s First Objection 
 
Gilmore rejects CASS in favor of the following account (2002, p. 254; I have slightly 
paraphrased Gilmore’s original formulation): 
 
(REL) Coexistence is relative to a hyperplane of simultaneity (HPS).  For any 
two enduring or perduring objects and any HPS, the objects in question 
coexist at this HPS iff their worldlines intersect it. 
 
Gilmore cites a number of reasons to prefer REL to CASS, chief among them being that, 
unlike CASS, REL makes the relevant notion of coexistence go hand in hand with 
simultaneity and, in addition, makes it a transitive relation (for a given HPS).  Both 
reasons, in my mind, have a classical origin and lose much of their force in making a 
transition to something as full of surprises as Minkowski spacetime.  I have more to say 
about transitivity in Sections 6.1 and 7.3  But in any event, the alleged advantages of REL 
are far from being decisive and are outweighed by what I take to be its major weakness, 
the fact that it violates the Objectivity requirement. 
To put the point in a deliberately grotesque form, on REL, there is no fact of the 
matter as to whether I coexist with Cody Gilmore, and this regardless whether we are 
enduring or perduring objects.  Neither is there a fact of the matter as to whether Cody 
coexists with any of his dissertation committee members.  Indeed, there is no fact of the 
matter about the coexistence of any two objects, including those whose histories closely 
overlap.  Even a pair of interwoven threads in a tapestry, which come to be and cease to 
exist together (let us suppose), do not coexist in any objective sense because, on REL, 
they do not coexist relative to a hyperplane of simultaneity drawn throw the temporal 
beginning or the end of one of them ‘slightly at an angle’, so that it does not intersect the 
worldline, or the worldworm, of the other.  I take this result to come very close to a 
reductio of REL and conclude that CASS, and hence BASC, hold up well in comparison.  
Coexistence must be objective. 
 With CASS and BASC thus rehabilitated, I now turn to a more controversial issue 
that has come to light in Gilmore’s critical study. 
 
 
3.  Coexistence and Existence@ 
 
As noted above, one of the classical endurantist notions of coexistence based on BASC—
that between an object wholly present at some point and another object considered in 
 
3 Cf. also Balashov, 2000a, pp. 140–141.  Considerations of space do not allow me to do justice to 
other astute remarks Gilmore has made about REL versus CASS and to a friendly amendment to CASS he 
has suggested. 
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abstraction from any of its locations—underlies the sense in which, at any moment of my 
life, many enduring objects in the universe can be divided into three classes: those with 
which, intuitively speaking, I coexist no longer; those with which I still or already 
coexist; and those with which I do not yet coexist.  As I grow older, the membership of 
these classes changes, thanks to the presence in our world of many enduring objects that 
come to be and cease to exist.  To use my older example (Balashov, 2000b), when I was 
fully present on 2/6/99, I still coexisted with Jordan’s King Hussein (who died the next 
day) and already coexisted with his son, Crown Prince Hassan.  A week later, when I was 
wholly present on 2/13/99, I no longer coexisted with the former, still coexisted with the 
latter, who then became King Abdullah, and not yet coexisted with Abdullah’s grandson. 
 These determinations can be transferred, unscathed, to Minkowski spacetime, as 
long as we take care to track momentary spatiotemporal locations of a given enduring 
object by some useful relativistically invariant parameter, for example, the object’s 
proper time (measuring the age of the object in its rest frame).  Of course, we now have 
to employ the relativistic versions of the endurantist coexistence principles (i.e., CE and 
its derivatives). 
 I argued, next, that in both cases, the classical as well as relativistic, there is an 
interesting notion of existence going hand in hand with coexistence.  For a given 
enduring object, the changing relations of coexistence it enters into during its life career 
provide a changing perspective on the rest of the world.  When I was fully present on 
2/6/99, there was a sense in which King Hussein still existed and Crown Prince Hassan 
already did.  A week later, on the other hand, the former existed no longer.  What reasons 
did I have to assert, on 2/13/99, that King Abdullah (= Crown Prince Hassan), but not the 
late King Hussein, was still in existence?  The reason seems clear: Abdullah, but not 
Hussein, coexisted with me, when I was wholly present on 2/13/99. 
 Before we go any farther, we need to make sure that the notion of existence just 
introduced is sensible.  Gilmore suggests, in effect, that it is not (2002, pp. 254–255).  
And there is no doubt that the notion is controversial.  In putting it forward, I am setting 
myself in opposition to one of the cornerstones of analytic philosophy, the thesis that 
existence is a univocal concept.  On the eternalist view presupposed throughout this 
discussion, past, present, and future entities are equally in existence.  This basic tenseless 
notion of existence applies to the late King Hussein, and even to the Babylonian king 
Nebuchadnezzar, no less than to King Abdullah.  It would appear that adding that the 
latter still exists but the former two do so no longer cuts no ontological ice but merely 
serves to say something about the object’s temporal (or spatiotemporal) location. 
 I am not sure that the boundary between the ontological and the locative can 
always be clearly drawn.  But I hope to provide, by the end of this paper, enough support 
for the thesis (named by Gilmore the Asymmetry Thesis; see below) that the ‘locative’ 
notion of existence—let us call it Existence@, to contrast it with existence simpliciter—
has significant implications for endurantism, but not for perdurantism, where its role boils 
down to representing certain ‘perspectival’ phenomena in spacetime.  This, however, 
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requires a lot of work, which still lies ahead.  At this point, I am concerned to establish 
the initial credentials of the notion of Existence@.  This, by itself, appears to be in 
defiance of common wisdom.  But I think there are good reasons to be defiant. 
 Concerning the distinction between existence and Existence@, note, first, that one 
can draw a parallel distinction between two concepts of coexistence, the narrow one 
discussed in this paper, according to which I coexist with King Abdullah but not with 
Nebuchadnezzar, and a broader concept, according to which all inhabitants of spacetime 
(including me and Nebuchadnezzar) coexist with each other.  The narrow concept is non-
trivial and informative in a way the second is not.  And since existence simpliciter goes 
hand in hand with the trivial notion of coexistence, it is natural to expect that there should 
be another notion of existence, to go along with Coexistence in the interesting sense.  
This other notion is, of course, Existence@. 
Second, the distinction between existence simpliciter and coexistence in the trivial 
sense, on one side, and Coexistence in the interesting sense and Existence@, on the other, 
is similar to another, and famous, distinction that does a great deal of work in modal 
realism.  As noted by David Lewis, to quantify correctly over possibilia and, in general, 
to do justice to modal discourse, the modal realist needs two different quantifiers: one 
ranging over the contents of the entire collection of possible worlds and the other 
restricted to a particular such world (see Lewis, 1986, pp. 3, 5–7, and elsewhere).  Any 
two objects populating the Lewisian multi-universe coexist in the broad sense, but those 
belonging to different worlds fail to coexist in the restricted sense.  An inhabitant of our 
world can state, with seriousness, that alien objects do not actually exist, meaning their 
non-existence in our world.  (Is such a statement ontological or ‘merely locative’?  I 
suppose this is debatable.  But no matter how one reads it, the statement is clearly 
significant.) 
The analogy with the temporal case works as follows.  Beginning with the 
classical context, associate with existence simpliciter the unrestricted quantifier ranging 
over all enduring objects.  Now for each particular t held fixed, introduce a restricted 
quantifier ranging over enduring objects located at t (i.e., at spacetime points belonging to 
HPSt).  The meaning of ‘Existence@’ is then associated with the family of such restricted 
quantifiers. 
Consider two enduring objects E1 and E2 located at t.  Such ‘t-mates’ coexist both 
in the trivial and in the interesting sense.  Consequently, for E1 at t, E2 coexists with it 
(hence, exists@) still or already.  Suppose another enduring object E3 ends its career at t′ 
< t.  Then although E1 at t and E3 at t′ coexist in the trivial sense, E1 and E2 fail to be t-
mates.  For E1 at t, E3 no longer coexists with it, hence no longer exists@. 
One might object that these locutions betray Existence@ as a relation to time and 
‘E exists@’ as an incomplete expression, and that this is inappropriate to any concept of 
existence deserving the name.  To this, I reply that the concept of existence at a world 
corresponding to the Lewisian restricted quantifier can similarly be looked upon as 
involving a relation to some inhabitant of a given world (viz., the world-mate relation) 
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and the corresponding expression ‘E exists’ (meaning its existence in that world) as an 
incomplete expression.  If that is unproblematic (which I think it is), then I don’t see why 
the relational (in a similar sense) nature of Existence@ should be problematic.  In 
essence, Existence@ behaves a lot like the indexical notion of actuality does in modal 
realism.  Any object that is a world-mate of a given object is actual.  Similarly, for any 
enduring object wholly present at t, another enduring object exists@ just in case it is also 
wholly present at t.  Statements of actuality in modal realism go hand in hand with 
statements of restricted coexistence, except that the former suppress mention of the object 
with respect to which actuality is covertly relative, in virtue of the world-mate relation.  
Similarly, statements of Existence@ go hand in hand with statements of Coexistence, 
except that the former suppress mention of the pair consisting of an object and a time (or 
a spacetime point) with respect to which Existence@ is covertly relative, in virtue of the 
t-mate relation. 
The relativistic generalization of Existence@ requires replacing the relation of 
belonging to the same (moment of absolute) time with the relation of spacelike 
separation.  If I am wholly present here and now (at O), any other enduring object 
exists@ just in case it coexists with me now (i.e., is wholly present at O* spacelike 
separated from O).  Moreover, it is appropriate to qualify the Existence@ of such objects 
with temporal modifiers still, already, not yet, and the like.  It is especially appropriate 
when the objects in question come to be and cease to exist ‘during’ my own life career. 
 This gives rise to the following situation represented in Figure 1.  (Here I am 
using my example from Balashov, 2000b, p. S560.)  Suppose I am wholly present at a 
certain moment of my proper time somewhere on Betelgeuse.  Then I still coexist with 
King Hussein and I already coexist with Hussein’s great-grandson.  Moreover, in view of 
the connection between Coexistence and Existence@, King Hussein still exists@, and his 
great-grandson already does.  In Gilmore’s apt expression (2002, p. 245), they are both 
‘temporally here’ for me now.  But this, I have argued, is unacceptable.  There is no 
temporally-laden sense in which King Hussein and his great-grandson can be in existence 
or ‘temporally here’ together: the former’s end lies in the absolute past of the latter’s 
beginning.  Since the endurantist is committed to this temporally-laden ‘togetherness’ 
claim in the relativistic context, endurantism is inferior to perdurantism. 
 
Figure 1. 
t
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This is surely a lot going on here.  One way to unpack it, which was suggested by 
Gilmore, is to identify two separate claims that come together to produce the above 
conclusion, the Asymmetry Thesis and the Absurdity Thesis.  According to the former, 
the endurantist is, but the perdurantist is not committed to the temporally-laden (and 
hence, potentially threatening) reading of the togetherness claim.  According to the 
Absurdity Thesis, this commitment is harmful to endurantism.  Gilmore objects to both 
theses.  In the next section I respond to his objection to the Asymmetry Thesis. 
 
 
4.  The Asymmetry Thesis: Gilmore’s Second Objection 
 
What makes King Hussein and his great-grandson ‘temporally here’ for me now—when I 
am located at O—is that, when I am so located, I coexist with both of them in one of the 
derivative senses of the basic endurantist coexistence relation BASC-EM.  The principle 
governing this derivative relation (call it Coexistence*) is as follows: 
 
(CE*) An enduring object E1 wholly present at O1 coexists* with another 
enduring object E2 considered in abstraction from its location just in case 
there is a spacetime point O2 such that E2 is wholly present at O2 and O2 is 
spacelike separated from O1. 
 
But the corresponding perdurantist principle is easily available too: 
 
(CP*) The O1-part of perduring object P1 coexists* with another perduring object 
P2 iff P2 has a part located at a spacetime point O2 that is spacelike 
separated from O1. 
 
This suggests that the perdurantist may also be entitled to an interesting notion of 
existence—call it ExistenceP@ similar to the endurantist notion of Existence@.  In 
particular, the perdurantist may want to say that, for any momentary part of perduring 
object P located at O, another perduring object existsP@ just in case it has a part located 
at a spacetime point that is spacelike separated from O.  And this implies that in scenarios 
such as one involving King Hussein and his great-grandson, the perdurantist is committed 
to an analog of the ‘togetherness claim’.  Suppose I am a perduring object and one of my 
parts is located at a certain moment t of my proper time somewhere on Betelgeuse.  Call 
this part Yuripart.  According to CP*, Yuripart coexists* with King Hussein and it also 
coexist* with Hussein’s great-grandson.  Moreover, in view of the connection between 
Coexistence* and ExistenceP@, King Hussein existsP@ and so does his great-grandson.  
They are both ‘temporally here’ for Yuripart.  It would seem that if the togetherness 
claim is unacceptable for the endurantist, then the perdurantist is no better off. 
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 My reasons for thinking otherwise are based on two distinctive features of the 
endurantist ontology.  The first such feature is that (a) an enduring object is wholly 
present at each moment of its proper time.  (a) is definitive of the very concept of 
endurantism.  My full presence at a certain place and time is, according to this concept, 
the most important fact about my existence and the focal point of my connection with the 
rest of the universe.  The second distinctive feature (b) of enduring objects is that they 
change their location with their proper time, and this induces change in relations of such 
objects to their environment.  As I become older, the membership of the class of objects 
with which I coexist*—hence of those that exist@—undergoes change.  This legitimizes 
ascribing to my coexistence* with them, and hence to their existence@, temporally-laden 
determinations, such as still, already and the like.  This, in turn, leads the endurantist to 
the togetherness claim, which, I have contended, is unacceptable. 
 There is no place for anything like (a) and (b) in the perdurantist ontology.  If I 
am a perduring object, I am never fully present at any one place and time.  At any such 
location, I am present only partially, and being only partially present there does not 
entitle me to temporally-laden determinations, as regards the existence@ of other objects 
and their coexistence* with me, that being fully present does.  Moreover, there is no 
sense in which perduring entities or their parts change their location in spacetime, no 
strict sense in which they age, and thus no robust sense in which their coexistence* with 
other objects (and hence those objects’ existence@) can be ascribed changing temporally-
laden qualifications (still, already, no longer, etc.).  The perdurantist relation 
Coexistence* holds between, and the property ExistenceP@ is possessed by, entities that 
are atemporally confined to their locations in spacetime.  It is therefore inappropriate to 
say that my 2/6/99 temporal part ‘used’ to coexist with King Hussein but does so ‘no 
longer’.  It is, arguably, also inappropriate to say that my entire four-dimensional 
worldworm used to coexist with him on 2/6/99 (more on this below). 
 Absent such temporally-laden connotations, the perdurantist notions of Coexist-
ence* and ExistenceP@ give rise, in the case of Hussein and his great-grandson, to the 
following innocuous situation.  My part referred to above as Yuripart, Hussein’s last part, 
and his great-grandson’s first part are all confined to their locations in Minkowski 
spacetime, and the fact that Yuripart coexists* with both is simply a further tenseless fact 
about us and our parts.  The perdurantist version of the togetherness claim is therefore 
entirely harmless.  This establishes the Asymmetry Thesis. 
 To recap, being wholly present at a spacetime point determines an enduring 
object’s changing relations to the rest of the universe in a way being only partially 
present at such a point does not for a perduring object.  But Gilmore has pressed the 
charge that although one cannot expect this service from a total four-dimensional 
perduring object, it could still be performed by its momentary temporal part.  Such a part 
is wholly present at a single spacetime point.  Doesn’t this allow one to associate with it a 
definite perspective on the rest of the world, thus restoring parity with endurantism?  
Moreover, isn’t there a sense in which this perspective is also temporally-laden.  As 
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Gilmore notes, “Insofar as perdurantism can be taken seriously, it must be consistent with 
… [the] undeniable fact that there is at least some weak sense in which George W. Bush 
is still or already in existence for me at the current point on my worldline” (2002, p. 252). 
 But is this weak sense strong enough to yield a togetherness claim as offending as 
the corresponding endurantist claim is?  I don’t think so.  The perdurantist claim is 
grounded in the perspective of a momentary temporal part of a perduring object, such as 
Yuripart.  But in the perdurantist ontology, Yuripart is not me but only a short stage of 
me.  So what is wholly present at a spacetime point—and what has a specific relation to 
the rest of the world—is not an ordinary object, Yuri, but a less familiar entity, Yuripart.  
In contrast, what is the focal point of such a relation in the case of endurantism is the 
ordinary enduring person in its entirety.  The contrast is quintessential to the whole issue 
between endurantism and perdurantism.  I submit that it cuts deep enough to render the 
perdurantist version of the togetherness claim ontologically innocent.  The “weak sense,” 
which is at work in Gilmore’s objection, is the vicarious sense in which the properties of 
temporal parts of perduring objects can be attributed to four-dimensional wholes.4  
Strictly speaking, Yuripart represents my perspective on the world no more than 
Yuripart1, Yuripart2, and countless other temporal parts of me do and thus cannot bear the 
weight of temporally-laden determinations, such as still and already, pertaining to the 
existence of other objects.  Such an object may be already in existence for Yuripart1 but 
not yet for Yuripart7.  And since neither Yuripart1, nor Yuripart7, nor any other temporal 
part of me represents my perspective par excellence, it is unclear what we ought to say 
about the existence (i.e., existenceP@) of the object in question.  On the other hand, if I 
am an enduring object wholly present at t, then my relation to other objects, associated 
with my temporary location, is determinate and non-vicariously mine. 
 This underscores the extent to which the ontology of perdurantism is revisionary.  
It denies that objects have temporary properties and locations in anything stronger than a 
vicarious sense.  Indeed, it is this denial that allows perdurantism to avoid the problem of 
coincident objects (“temporal overlap is not coincidence”), which constitutes one of the 
strongest reasons in its favor (see Heller, 2002 for a recent discussion).  As usual, 
 
4 In this respect, the stage theory (Sider, 2001, Section 5.8; Hawley, 2001), historically the second 
variety of four-dimensionalism, which takes ordinary objects to be (rather than to have) momentary stages, 
does better than the more traditional perdurantism, or the worm theory.  On the stage theory, temporary 
properties and momentary locations are possessed, in the strict sense, by ordinary objects rather than by 
their parts.  My argument (in Balashov, 2000a, 2000b) would, therefore, be ineffective as a defense of the 
stage-theoretic version of four-dimensionalism against endurantism.  But the stage theory has its share of 
problems; see, e.g., Haslanger, 2003, Section 6, and Balashov, 2002, where I discuss and defend other 
relativistic arguments, this time favoring the worm theory over the stage theory.  Importantly, they ride on a 
feature that makes the stage theory closer to endurantism than to perdurantism, viz., the idea that persisting 
objects themselves (not their parts) are wholly present at all moments at which they exist.  This proximity 
makes endurantism vulnerable to versions of the relativistic arguments against the stage theory developed 
in Balashov, 2002, and serves as the basis of later sections of the present paper. 
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strength comes with a price tag: revisionism.  But perdurantism is no more revisionary 
than its natural partner, the B-theory of time, which has to be decidedly deflationary 
about many common-sense notions, such as change, the ‘passage’ of time, and our 
different attitudes toward the past and the future.  Evaluating a particular ontology 
requires taking into account the entire body of evidence for and against it, experiential as 
well as theoretical.  Revisionary though it is, perdurantism is a major contender in the 
debate about persistence. 
 This concludes my defense of the Asymmetry Thesis.  (There is more to say in 
response to Gilmore’s critique of it, but I have to limit myself to the bare essentials here.)  
In conjunction with CASS, it commits the endurantist to the temporally-laden version of 
the togetherness claim, which was briefly described above.  To repeat, if I am wholly 
present at a certain far-away point, I coexist* with King Hussein (who is no longer alive 
for us) and also coexist* with his great-grandson (who is not yet born).  This authorizes 
me to say that they both exist@—both are ‘temporally here’ for me.  And this, I have 
argued, is unacceptable.  Hussein and his great-grandson cannot be in existence together 
in any temporally-laden sense.  Claims of this sort are absurd.  But Gilmore has argued 
that they are not. 
 
 
5.  The Absurdity Thesis: Gilmore’s Third Objection 
 
More precisely, Gilmore has argued that someone who subscribes to CASS (Coexistence 
As Spacelike Separation) should not be offended by the temporally-laden version of the 
togetherness claim.  CASS by itself involves such a radical departure from our naïve 
intuitive ideas about coexistence that making a further step by accepting the 
consequences of the togetherness claim should not be especially troubling.  Thus 
Gilmore: 
 
If I am willing to broaden my ideas about coexistence so as to allow for the possibility that I now 
coexist with both of two things that never coexist with each other, then I should also be willing to 
broaden my ideas associated with the phrase “are still or already in existence for me”: I should 
then be willing to broaden these latter ideas so as to allow for the possibility that there is at least 
some weak sense in which the given phrase can apply to both of two things that never coexist with 
each other.  (Gilmore, 2002, p. 246) 
 
Is there room for disagreement here?  I suppose there is.  The whole issue boils down, at 
this point, to the question of how to extend our ordinary notions into the relativistic 
domain: what can be sacrificed and what has to be retained at all costs.  And since we 
have already left behind many ordinary beliefs (e.g., those about absolute simultaneity 
and universal time), we are swimming in uncharted waters.  Consequently, there may be 
no shared standards that could resolve the issue of how to extrapolate old concepts into 
the new domain to everyone’s satisfaction.  One might still insist that the endurantist 
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should accept CASS, simply because it is the only plausible extension of the interesting 
sense of coexistence into the relativistic domain, and, at the same time, reject the 
temporally-laden togetherness claim.  But instead of pursuing this line, let me concede 
that the case is not conclusive.  Having defended CASS and the Asymmetry Thesis 
against Gilmore’s first two objections, I am inclined to agree with him that endorsing 
CASS takes the sting from the endurantist version of the togetherness claim. 
 But the foregoing analysis suggests a way of reinforcing the case.  Building on the 
results established so far, I develop, in the remainder of this paper, two other arguments 
of the same broad variety (i.e., also centered on the notion of coexistence), which show 
that the togetherness claim, even if relatively innocent by itself, is just one species of a 
family of progressively more harmful consequences of the general idea that coexistence 
in Minkowski spacetime hinges on spacelike separation, and that the pressure on the 
endurantist to reject those other consequences is greater than the pressure, defied by 
Gilmore (and, I suppose, by others), to reject the simple togetherness claim.5 
 
 
6.  Coexistence As Sharing a Hyperplane of Simultaneity 
 
6.1.  From CASS to CASH.  Constructing the new arguments requires a generalization of 
CASS and of the ensuing principles of coexistence.  All these principles define coexist-
ence as a relation holding between a pair of entities located at particular spacetime 
points.  As a result, the principles become rather restrictive.  The potentially offending 
endurantist version of the togetherness claim turns almost entirely on this overly 
restrictive character of CE and CE*.  Indeed, the situation it describes involves an 
enduring object E wholly present at spacetime point O and two other enduring objects E1 
and E2, considered in abstraction from their locations, such that E at O coexists* with E1, 
and it also coexists* with E2.  This entails that E1 and E2 are both in existence@ (for E at 
O).  But E1 does not coexist with E2 in any of the senses allowed by the endurantist 
principles of coexistence.  As we have learned by now, this may or may not be ‘absurd’.  
I want to suggest that whatever trouble there may be in this situation, it should be blamed 
primarily on the restricted adicity of the coexistence relations defined by CE and CE*.  
Given that spacelike separation is not transitive and that coexistence holds between pairs 
of objects, should someone who is committed to CASS be surprised to discover that in 
some cases, E at O coexists* with E1 and also coexists* with E2, but E1 does not coexist 
with E2?  Not necessarily.  After all, from the fact that E at O coexists* with E1 and E at 
O coexists* with E2, it does not even follow that E at O coexists* with E1 and E2.  True, 
 
5 As already noted, the arguments developed below are similar to the earlier relativistic arguments 
defending the worm theory against the stage theory (Balashov, 2002), despite the difference in context.  
Below I take the liberty to use, with appropriate modifications, some considerations and examples from my 
earlier work. 
Relativity, Coexistence and Temporal Parts 
15 
the latter can be said to be both in existence (i.e., in existence@) for E at O—but, one 
wants to add, “not in the same sense.”  Their existence@ has different indexical 
modifiers.  E at O shares a certain hyperplane of simultaneity (HPS) with E1 (when the 
latter is wholly present at a suitable spacetime point), and it shares another HPS with E2.  
But there is no single HPS that they all share.6  If there were such a common HPS then 
the situation that led to the allegedly offending togetherness claim would never arise in 
the first place and, hence, the endurantist would have nothing to worry about. 
 These observations suggest that, given non-transitivity of the grounding relation 
of spacelike separation, it may be unfair to start by saddling the endurantist with the 
dyadic relation of coexistence7 and then go on to blame her, in essence, for the non-
transitive character of this relation.  It is also unclear whether grounding the interesting 
notion of coexistence (i.e., one that is neither empty nor universal) in a relation of fixed 
adicity is, in general, the best way to treat this notion.  It seems reasonable to allow 
objects to coexist with each other, not merely pairwise, but en masse. 
These considerations invite promoting the dyadic relation of coexistence to a 
multigrade relation.  And for anyone who accepts CASS, the natural way to do it is to 
generalize the relation of spacelike separation between momentary spacetime locations of 
two entities to the n-place relation of belonging to a single HPS.  In the hands of the 
endurantist, the basic idea of Coexistence As Sharing a Hyperplane (of Simultaneity) 
(CASH) gives rise to the following generalizations of CE and CE* (the corresponding 
perdurantist generalizations of CP and CP* are also easily available): 
 
(CE-CASH) Enduring objects E1, … En located at spacetime points O1, … On 
respectively coexist iff O1, … On belong to a common HPS. 
(CE*-CASH) Enduring object E wholly present at O coexists* with enduring 
objects E1, … En, considered in abstraction from their locations, 
just in case there are spacetime points O1, … On such that E1, … En 
are wholly present at O1, … On respectively and O, O1, … On 
belong to a common HPS. 
 
6.2.  CASH versus CASS.  For two objects, CASH simply reduces to CASS.  But 
in general, CASH is an improvement on CASS.  It allows one to do justice to the idea 
that many objects—all the pieces of furniture in my office, all the people currently alive, 
all the planets in the Solar system, and all the StarTrek characters—can bear a single 
relation of coexistence to each other.  It is true that if n momentary spacetime locations 
(of enduring objects or of temporal parts of perduring objects) satisfy CASH, then taken 
 
6 Cf. Gilmore (2002, pp. 258f) who makes essentially the same point, but in a different context, 
that of defending REL over CASS in his first objection. 
7 Dyadic, in the sense that it relates E1-at-O1 with E2-at-O2.  In another sense, noted in Section 1, 
this relation (i.e., BASC) is tetradic. 
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pairwise, they also satisfy CASS.  But the contrary does not hold.  In general, for n > 4, if 
spacetime points O1, … On are pairwise spacelike separated, it does not follow that O1, … 
On belong to a common HPS.  In this respect, CASH is more comprehensive than CASS.  
It grants coexistence en masse to a family of objects that, intuitively speaking, coexist all 
together and not just pairwise. 
 CASH also eliminates the injustice, which may (as I have conceded) have been 
done to the endurantist by the Absurdity Thesis, and, hence, it eliminates the reason for 
Gilmore’s objection to this thesis, by precluding the ‘absurd’ situations from arising in 
the first place.  If I am wholly present at some moment of my proper time on Betelgeuse, 
then I coexist* with King Hussein and I also coexist* with his great-grandson in the sense 
of CE* but not in the sense of CE*-CASH.  And this makes it entirely perspicuous that 
broadening our ideas about coexistence, in making a transition to the relativistic domain, 
must go hand in hand, as Gilmore has suggested (2002, p. 246), with broadening our 
ideas about the use of temporal determinations such as still and already.  On CE*-CASH, 
it is simply not the case that I still coexist with King Hussein and already coexist with his 
great-grandson.  But this is so because I do not coexist* with them at all: we do not share 
a common HPS.  This blocks the next move, the ascription of the temporally-laden sense 
of existence@ to both of them, at an early stage. 
The classical limit of CASH is clearly the old classical notion of existing at the 
same moment of absolute time.  This is also true of CASS.  But in the case of CASH, 
recovering the intuitively correct classical limit is especially valuable, since CASH is 
broader in scope and thus comes closer to the common notion of coexistence as a 
multigrade relation, even if it becomes, as a result, less permissive in granting mutual 
coexistence to a collection of objects. 
 Our primary interest, however, lies in those features of the relativistic coexistence 
relations stemming from CASH in which they deviate from their classical counterparts.  
Before turning to them, let us go back to the important notion of existence@ and 
introduce its generalized version.  It will be convenient to start with the classical (non-
relativistic) context.  This may also be a good occasion to switch to different examples. 
 6.3.  Existence@, coexistence, t-mates, and temporal worlds in classical 
spacetime.  There is a familiar sense in which the enduring Descartes, Galileo, Kepler, 
and Brahe coexisted in 1600, but not in 1620 (Figure 2).  The locations of these persons 
at some point in 1600 belong to the same moment of absolute time (or to a common 
absolute hyperplane of simultaneity).  This is not true of any moment in 1620, because 
(sadly) Brahe has no location at any moment in 1620.  Let us call items sharing a 
common moment t of absolute time t-mates.  For the endurantist, such items are enduring 
objects wholly present at t.  For the perdurantist, they are momentary t-parts of perduring 
objects. 
The enduring Descartes, Galileo, Kepler, and Brahe are 1600-mates but not 1620-
mates.  In the classical context, entities that are t-mates coexist (en masse) in the 
interesting sense and exist@ in the sense associated with the restricted quantifier ranging 
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over items wholly present at t (see Section 3).  On the other hand, all objects 
whatsoever—past, present, and future—coexist in the trivial sense, and, of course, all 
such objects exist (simpliciter).  Galileo, Kepler, and Brahe all exist@ for Descartes at 
1600, but not for Descartes at 1620.  As already noted, they coexist, in the interesting 
sense, in 1600, but not in 1620.  On the other hand, all these persons also coexist with 
each other in the trivial sense, as populating the same four-dimensional spacetime 
manifold, and, of course, they coexist, in that sense, with everything else that ever 
existed, exists or will exist in the entire history of the universe. 
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Figure 2. 
  
Just like their dyadic predecessors, the endurantist notions of coexistence and 
Existence@ are temporally-laden.  It makes sense to say that, in 1600, Galileo still 
coexisted with Brahe and already coexisted with Descartes and Kepler (Figure 2).  
Galileo continued to coexist with Descartes and Kepler in 1620, but no longer with 
Brahe.  As Galileo grew older, his coexistence relations with other enduring objects in the 
universe underwent change and, with them, his perspective on their existence.  It is 
perfectly reasonable to say that, for Galileo in 1600, Descartes, Kepler, and Brahe were 
still in existence (i.e., in existence@).  This is no longer the case for Galileo in 1620. 
 Besides the trivial sense, in which all enduring objects share a single four-
dimensional spacetime world, there is, then, an interesting sense in which they can share 
or fail to share ‘temporal worlds’ at certain moments of their individual time (which 
coincides with the common absolute time in the pre-relativistic setting), just as there is an 
interesting sense in which Lewisian objects may or may not be world-mates, despite the 
fact that there is a broader sense in which they all coexist by sharing the entire Lewisian 
pluriverse.  The analogy should by now be clear. 
There is, however, a notable disanalogy between the worlds of modal realism and 
temporal worlds.  No two Lewisian possible worlds overlap, because no object can exist 
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in more than one such world.  But if endurantism is true, then distinct temporal worlds 
(i.e., the occupants of distinct absolute hyperplanes of simultaneity cutting across the 
entire universe) may contain the same enduring objects.  Thus the 1600-world and the 
1620-world both contain the self-same Descartes, Galileo, Kepler and many other 
enduring objects populating both worlds.  This dissimilarity does not preclude one from 
making a distinction between the two senses of coexistence and, hence, of existence (i.e., 
the trivial and the interesting).  In fact, it underscores the important respect in which 
Descartes’ temporary relations to other objects change with his age: it is the very same 
Descartes who, first, shares a temporal world with Brahe and, then, fails to share such a 
world with him. 
 On the other hand, if perdurantism is true, then distinct classical temporal worlds 
do not overlap.  In this respect, the classical ontology of perdurantism shares more 
common features with modal realism than the classical ontology of endurantism does.  
But it is a consequence of this affinity that the corresponding perdurantist notions of 
coexistence (and of ExistenceP@) are devoid of temporally-laden connotations.  There is 
no sense in which the 1600 part of Descartes becomes older and its view on the rest of the 
world changes.  And there is, at best, only an indirect sense in which this may be true of 
the entire perduring Descartes.  This, of course, is simply more grist for the Asymmetry 
Thesis (see Section 4), now generalized in accordance with CASH. 
 Let me now introduce the relativistic versions of the above notions. 
 6.4.  Existence@, coexistence, HPS-mates, and temporal-like worlds in Minkow-
ski spacetime.  According to CASH, coexistence in Minkowski spacetime is a matter of 
sharing a hyperplane of simultaneity (HPS), as reflected in the statements of CE-CASH, 
CE*-CASH, and their perdurantist counterparts (Section 6.1).  In difference from the 
classical case, there is no privileged family of HPSs.  But the notion of sharing a common 
HPS is as close as one can get to the classical notion of sharing a moment of common 
time.  In fact, an HPS represents a moment of time in a particular frame of reference.  
Just like its classical counterpart, it stretches across the entire world.  Indeed, the 
occupant of a given HPS is the world at a certain moment of time in some inertial frame.  
Let us refer to it as a temporal-like world, and let us call the inhabitants of a temporal-like 
world HPS-mates.  Such inhabitants may be enduring objects wholly present at spacetime 
points lying on a given HPS, or momentary temporal parts of perduring objects.  HPS-
mates all coexist with each other in an interesting sense.  And for any entity wholly 
present at a spacetime point, there is a sense in which its HPS-mates exist@.  But in light 
of the Asymmetry Thesis, the interesting notion of coexistence and the corresponding 
notion of Existence@ are temporally-laden only for the endurantist, not for the 
perdurantist.  (More on this in the next two sections.) 
For all practical purposes, the relativistic notions based on CASH are 
indistinguishable from their classical limits when they are applied to objects of everyday 
life.  Thus what has just been said about Descartes and his contemporaries remains valid 
in the relativistic framework.  In general, an inquiry about what enduring objects coexist 
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with what other objects in relativistic spacetime should start with a particular object of 
interest E wholly present at spacetime point O at a certain time t in its life career (i.e., its 
proper time) and then pose the question as to what objects it coexists with (in the sense of 
CE-CASH).  Other objects enter into such a relation of coexistence with E at O by being 
wholly present at spacetime points sharing a common HPS with O.  On this approach, E 
at O turns out to coexist (as it should) with what we would pre-relativistically count as its 
‘contemporaries’ and not coexist with any of its ‘predecessors’. 
The notion of a relativistic ‘contemporary’ is, of course, different from its 
classical counterpart.  Classical contemporaries exist at the same moment of a single 
time, the absolute Newtonian time.  No such concept is available in the relativistic frame-
work.  But there is a good substitute.  Each relativistic contemporary of E at t is a certain 
age, the age in question being measured by the proper time of that contemporary.  In the 
end, this enables all relativistic contemporaries, including E itself, to enter into a single 
many-place relation of coexistence with each other on a par.  Thus, the 30-year old Data, 
the 46-year old Captain James T. Kirk, and the 65-year old Captain Jean Luc Picard are 
contemporaries of each other; they are HPS-mates.  On the other hand, Klingon Trevor is 
the relativistic predecessor of all of them: none of his momentary locations shares a 
temporal-like world with any momentary location of the first three (Figure 3). 
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Figure 3. 
 
Notably, the same 30-year old Data is also a contemporary of the 40-year old 
Captain Kirk and the 55-year old Captain Picard.  This is a consequence of the latitude 
allowed by relativistic spacetime.  It may be surprising but it does not look pernicious—
not yet.  But the point to note here is that, unlike classical temporal worlds, their 
relativistic descendants may ‘crisscross’: two HPSs may intersect ‘at an angle’ in 
spacetime and thus contain the same enduring object of a certain age or the same stage of 
a perduring object.  This is in addition to the sense in which even classical temporal 
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worlds, which do not literally intersect in spacetime (since the absolute HPSs they 
populate are always parallel), may nonetheless overlap in virtue of containing the same 
enduring object. 
 
 
7.  Contextuality 
 
Let us return, for a moment, to the situation discussed in connection with the Absurdity 
Thesis.  Enduring object E at O coexists*, in the sense of CE*-CASH, with E1 and with 
E2 but not with both: there is no single temporal-like world containing O and some 
momentary locations of both E1 and E2 (Figure 4).  Informed by Gilmore’s reasons 
against the Absurdity Thesis, we may wonder, however, why there should be such a 
single world, given that E2 lies entirely in the absolute future of E1 and that, 
consequently, E1 and E2 fail to coexist with each other.  E1 may be Captain Kirk’s great-
grandfather and E2 his great-grandson.  It would be rather strange for anyone to be a 
‘contemporary’ of both. 
 
Figure 4.
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So far so good.  But the problem is easily reproduced by separating E1 and E2 
widely enough in space (Figure 5).  There we have a situation in which E1 does coexist 
(in the sense of CE-CASH) with E2 (their momentary locations O1 and O2 share a 
common HPS), and E at O coexists with E1 at O1 and E2 at O2—but not with both. 
 
Figure 5.
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A similar feature is characteristic of the notion of overlap.  This notion is a further 
generalization of Coexistence* and was briefly mentioned in Section 1.4.  The CASH 
endurantist version of it can be defined as follows: 
 
(E-Overlap) Enduring objects E1, … En, considered in abstraction from their 
locations, temporally E-overlap iff there are spacetime points O1, 
… On, such that E1, … En are wholly present at O1, … On 
respectively and O1, … On belong to a common HPS. 
 
Consider three enduring objects that come to be and cease to exist.  Then they may 
coexist pairwise at some point or other of their life careers.  In other words, they may E-
overlap.  But this does not guarantee that they coexist (in the same sense) all together.  
The failure of such mutual coexistence occurs in cases in which no selection of 
momentary locations of the three objects can be unified by a single triadic HPS-mate 
relation.  Thus it may be the case that Data E-overlaps with Captain Kirk, Captain Kirk 
E-overlaps with Captain Picard, and the latter with Data.  Taken pairwise, they all share 
temporal-like worlds with each other.  Taken all together, however, they do not share any 
single temporal-like world (Figure 6). 
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Figure 6. 
 
The same is true of a quadruple of objects.  All the triples constructed out of them 
may coexist, in the sense of CE-CASH or E-overlap; but this does not entail the 
coexistence or E--overlap of all four.  (Considerations of space prevent me from illustrat-
ing such a case.) 
These results, which can be extended to more numerous collections of objects, 
show that coexistence in the relativistic world of enduring objects is partitioned in a most 
peculiar way bearing the mark of contextuality: facts about coexistence of the members 
of a collection of objects, however numerous, become sensitive to what other objects are 
taken into account.  Such facts do not ‘add up’ properly. 
Contextuality of coexistence should not be confused with the breakdown of 
transitivity.  As we know by now, the various relations of coexistence between members 
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of pairs of objects in the relativistic world generally fail to be transitive.  For example, 
coexistence, in the sense of E-Overlap, of E with E1 and of E with E2 does not entail the 
coexistence, in the same sense, of E1 with E2.  Contextuality, on the other hand, means 
that the coexistence between the members of all such pairs does not entail the coexistence 
among the members of the whole triple: E, E1, and E2. 
Why should anyone be bothered by contextuality but not so much by the lack of 
transitivity?  One reason is that transitivity fails, for some senses of coexistence, even in 
the classical situation.  I coexist (i.e., temporal overlap) with my father and he coexists 
(in the same sense) with my grandfather.  But I do not coexist with my grandfather.  But 
the classical relation of coexistence is free of contextuality.  If my father, my grandfather, 
and I overlap pairwise then we overlap all together.  We do not find this remarkable 
because we simply take it for granted.  But for the endurantist who takes relativity 
seriously, something important is at stake here. 
Indeed, enduring objects live in temporal-like worlds; those are where they are 
wholly present and those are what they share—much as objects in Lewis’s ontology live 
in and share particular possible worlds.  In a trivial sense, the latter also share the entire 
collection of worlds.  But nothing significant turns on this broader notion.  All the 
important features of the possible worlds ontology, including the modal properties of 
objects, are grounded in the facts about what objects belong to what worlds.  The fact that 
every object also belongs to the whole collection of worlds bakes no bread.  Similarly, 
the endurantist should take the facts about what object belongs to what temporal-like 
world at what point in its career—and what other objects it shares that world with—as the 
ground of all the important features exhibited in the temporal ‘multi-universe’.  These 
include temporary properties of objects and their changing relations with each other.  The 
fact that all enduring objects trivially share the single spacetime manifold gives no further 
purchase. 
The endurantist must thus recognize existence in a temporal (or temporal-like) 
world and sharing such a world as basic facts.  But then it is natural to expect such facts 
to obey a reasonable ‘calculus’.  And they certainly do so in the classical case, where the 
t-mate relation is grounded in the absolute simultaneity among momentary locations of 
enduring objects.  Minkowski spacetime suggests a bona fide candidate to do a similar 
job, the HPS-mate relation, which adequately recovers its pre-relativistic counterpart in 
the classical limit.  The problem with it is that it stumbles upon a simple rule that is, 
intuitively, part and parcel of the concept of coexistence: to put it in a grotesque form, if 
any 999 members of a collection of 1000 objects coexist with each other, then all 1000 
objects must do so as well. 
But isn’t the same true of momentary parts, or stages, of perduring objects?  After 
all, aren’t they similar to enduring objects in this respect at least that they are wholly 
present at spacetime points?  If so, the stages’ coexistence relations with each other in the 
relativistic world must be partitioned in the same way as the corresponding relations of 
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enduring objects taken at certain moments of their careers.  And if the latter fail to obey a 
‘reasonable calculus’, then so must the former. 
I cannot but agree with this.  And I take this to be a reason to prefer the 
perdurance theory of persistence to the stage theory (see note 4 on the stage theory).  The 
argument to this effect is developed elsewhere (Balashov, 2002).  Our target here, 
however, is endurantism, not the stage theory.  And it has already emerged in our 
discussion of the Asymmetry Thesis that perduring objects do not ‘live’ in temporal-like 
worlds: they are too long to fit in there.  The fact that their momentary parts do provides 
an indirect sense in which one could speak of the coexistence relations among perduring 
wholes ‘taken’ at certain moments of their individual times.  But such relations are of 
secondary importance to the perdurantist ontology.  Their failure to obey a ‘reasonable 
calculus’ is, therefore, metaphysically inconsequential. 
I submit that the best way to categorize such derivative relations is to treat them 
as perspectival relations in spacetime.  A spatial analogy may be helpful here.  A typical 
art museum has numerous exposition rooms variously connected to each other by wide 
entrances on their sides.  There may be a location in one of the rooms from which one 
can see through several such openings and thus ‘line up’ several rooms in a single line of 
sight.  One can even manage to see some paintings or parts thereof in distant rooms.  
Slightly changing one’s location may significantly affect the arrangement of the rooms in 
the line of sight: some openings may disappear from it and others emerge.  There may be 
a perspective in which Room 101, say, is lined up in this way with Rooms 102, and 104; 
another perspective in which Rooms 101, 103 and 104 are so lined up; and another in 
which Rooms 102, 103, and 104 are.  But there may be no single perspective in which all 
four rooms could be lined up.  This tells us something informative about the floor plan of 
the museum.  But it has no further implications. 
Similarly, the distribution of perduring objects in spacetime tells us something 
useful about the way their stages relate to each other.  But given the central thesis of 
perdurantism—that ordinary objects are four-dimensional entities and not stages8—we 
should view the spatio-temporal relations among the stages as merely perspectival 
features of a collection of perduring wholes, exhibited in the single spacetime manifold, 
not as fundamental facts about their existence and coexistence.  Unlike enduring objects 
(and unlike stages), such wholes do not live in (and hence, cannot share) temporal-like 
worlds.  What counts as a world for the former is no more than a perspective for the 
latter. 
Contextuality is only part of the price endurantism has to pay in the transition to 
relativity.  Besides being contextual, coexistence in the relativistic world of enduring 
objects may exhibit chronological incoherence. 
 
 
8 See the end of Section 4 for the importance as well as the counterintuitive nature of this thesis, 
and for its role in dissolving the problem of coincident objects. 
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8.  Chronological Incoherence 
 
Let us start with an unproblematic case.  The 30-year old Data coexists with the 35-year 
old Captain Kirk and the 40-year old Captain Picard: they share a common temporal-like 
world occupying HPS1.  As Data grows older and reaches the age of 35, he happens to 
coexist with the younger Captain Kirk and Captain Picard, who both have just turned 32: 
the three characters share a common temporal-like world occupying HPS2 (Figure 7). 
 
 
Data Picard 
Kirk 
30
35
32
35
44
40
46
32 
HPS1
HPS2
HPS3
 
Figure 7. 
 
This, however, should not be viewed as being particularly disturbing.  At any 
moment in his life, Data belongs to an infinite number of temporal-like worlds.  The fact 
that one can pick out a chronologically incoherent series of such worlds (e.g., those 
occupying HPS1 and HPS2, in this order) should not be held against the endurantist, as 
long as another, chronologically coherent series is available; for example, the series 
including HPS1 and HPS3.  The temporal-like world occupying HPS3 features the 35-year 
old Data, and the correspondingly older Captain Kirk and Captain Picard.  One is not 
saddled with the offending sequence of HPS1 and HPS2, because there is no reason to 
allow one to exploit the latitude inherent in relativistic spacetime frivolously, by 
sequencing temporal-like worlds at will.  The availability of chronologically coherent 
series of such worlds is all that the StarTrek biographer needs to tell a sensible story 
about the life careers of the three famous characters and their relations to each other. 
But there are cases where a chronologically coherent series of temporal-like 
worlds is not available (unless one makes such a series improperly short) and there is no 
escape from a disturbing conclusion that ageing results in being a contemporary of 
progressively younger companions.  One case of this sort is sketched in Figure 8.  Here 
the most one can do is to identify a chronologically coherent series of temporal-like 
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worlds containing the correspondingly ageing Data, Kirk, and Picard, for example, some 
series including HPS1 and HPS2, in this order.  Adding Trevor to the picture, however, 
turns the series into a bad one.  As Data, Kirk, and Picard all grow older, they find 
themselves in worlds with the younger and younger Trevor.  And that is not the worst 
possible scenario yet.  With some modifications, one could make progressively ageing 
Data, Kirk, and Picard unavoidable contemporaries of, first, Chief Trevor, next the 15-
year old Cadet Trevor, then the newly born Klingon baby just named Trevor, and 
eventually, Trevor’s great-grand-grandfather!  This is surely an unwelcome result.  Along 
with contextuality, it brings out the difficulties of formulating the many-place coexistence 
relations in the relativistic world of enduring objects. 
 
 
Data 
Picard 
Kirk 
Trevor 
HPS1
HPS2
 
Figure 8. 
 
Why is perdurantism not afflicted with the same or similar problems?  One reason 
has been noted earlier: there is no strict sense in which perduring objects can be said to 
age.  The bearing of considerations having to do with ageing on perdurantism is, 
therefore, indirect and ontological harmless.  This is sufficient to uphold the asymmetry 
between perdurantism and endurantism in the face of chronologically incoherent series. 
But it is worth repeating that there is another and more general aspect of the 
asymmetry that pertains both to contextuality and chronological incoherence, even 
though the former is a ‘static’ phenomenon, having to do with a collection of objects 
taken at particular moments of their individual times or in complete abstractions from 
them, whereas the latter is a ‘dynamic’ phenomenon having to do with ageing.  The 
feature common to both of them is that perduring objects do not occupy the sort of 
habitats (i.e., temporal-like worlds confined to single HPSs) that may exhibit 
contextuality or chronological incoherence of coexistence.  All perduring entities coexist 
with each other in the Minkowski world.  This does not mean that one cannot pose 
temporally qualified questions about the coexistence of their various parts.  And the 
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answers to them are informative as they tell one something about the overall distribution 
of perduring objects in spacetime.  But the CASH value of such information is 
perspectival, not ontological. 
 
 
9.  Another Objection 
 
Contextuality and chronological incoherence of multigrade coexistence relations in 
Minkowski spacetime could, in principle, be mitigated by identifying the loci of 
temporal-like worlds, not with flat hyperplanes of simultaneity, as CASH prescribes, but 
with generic spacelike hypersurfaces of variable curvature.9  Adopting this course would 
preclude the offending situations described in Sections 7 and 8 from arising, because the 
following mathematical fact about Minkowski spacetime obtains: 
 
(FACT) For any set of pairwise spacelike separated points O1, … On in 
Minkowski spacetime, there is a continuous three-dimensional 
spacelike surface containing O1, … On. 
 
FACT is non-trivial, and the proof, on behalf of the objector, is given in the Appendix.10 
But I think doubts can be raised as to whether curved spacelike hypersurfaces 
would provide an adequate framework for temporal-like worlds in Minkowski spacetime.  
First, the spatial geometry of such worlds would, in general, be non-Euclidean.  Second, 
the non-trivial nature of FACT (see note 10) and the complicated profile of function F 
(see Appendix) strongly suggest (even if they do not strictly establish) that getting around 
contextuality and chronological incoherence in sufficiently complex situations would 
result in exceedingly ‘bent’ and ‘unstable’ temporal-like worlds—unstable in the sense 
that small shifts in the mutual arrangement of objects and adding new objects to existing 
collections could induce drastic disturbances in the profile of the resulting ‘coexistence 
surface’ and its spatial geometry.  Note that disturbances of this sort may occur in 
locations far away from the shifts precipitating them (another manifestation of 
contextuality or, perhaps, ‘non-locality’?). 
For example, as regards contextuality, suppose three objects coexisting in a 
certain spatially flat temporal-like world form an Euclidean triangle there (i.e., a triangle 
 
9 I thank Cody Gilmore and the referee for this Journal for impressing upon me the importance of 
addressing this objection. 
10 To see that FACT is indeed non-trivial, note that a hyperplane defined by a triangle of three 
pairwise spacelike-related points in 2+1 spacetime need not be everywhere spacelike.  Assume c = 1 and 
the following Cartesian coordinates of four points: O1 (–10,0,0), O2 (0,–10,11), O3 (0,10,11), and O 
(0,0,11).  While O1, O2 and O3 are pairwise spacelike separated, O1 and O (which is the midpoint of the line 
segment O2O3) are not. 
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whose angles sum up to two right angles).  Adding other objects to the coexistence pool 
could make things go ‘wild’, even among the members of the original group: the triangle 
they define might suddenly stop being Euclidean, and this for no physical reason. 
Similarly, a ‘temporal’ sequence of curved surfaces that preserves chronological 
coherence may feature members so peculiarly bent that doubts may arise that saving 
coherence at such a cost would be a good deal.  For example, a series of temporal-like 
worlds preserving chronological coherence in the situation depicted in Figure 8 would 
feature significantly ageing Data, Kirk, and Trevor (say, by decades) along with Picard 
who would be ageing only minutely, say, by a fraction of a year—or a month, or a 
second!  Out of the frying pan and into the fire? 
 These observations suggest, then, that irregularly curved spacelike surfaces do 
not, in general, provide natural and well-behaved receptacles for temporal-like worlds.  
One might think that a better candidate for this role would be a uniform family of 
hypersurfaces associated with cosmological time in smoothened-out models of the 
universe.  But since such a series would lack any ‘flexibility’ (even the flexibility enjoyed 
by HPSs stretching through spacetime at arbitrary ‘angles’), it would only exacerbate the 
original problems.11 
 
  
10.  Conclusions 
 
The foregoing discussion prompted by Gilmore’s enlightening critique has brought forth 
some important lessons.  First, the interesting notion of coexistence has genuinely 
ontological significance for endurantism, but not for perdurantism.  This serves to uphold 
the Asymmetry Thesis (more precisely, its CASH-based modification).  Second, the 
interesting notion of coexistence must be grounded in a multigrade relation among the 
momentary locations of enduring objects in Minkowski spacetime (or of momentary 
stages of perduring objects).  Accordingly, CASS must be replaced with CASH, which is, 
arguably, the best account of (the interesting notion of) coexistence in the relativistic 
context.  In light of this modification, it becomes clear that the original version of the 
Absurdity Thesis, focused on the temporal connotations of the ‘togetherness claim’, 
cannot be sustained.  This sets Gilmore’s objection to it in perspective.  The objection 
must be conceded by anyone committed to CASS.  But the replacement of CASS with 
CASH also suggests that the simple togetherness claim is only one, and relatively 
 
11 The brief discussion above suggests that the issues raised in the series of papers exploring the 
impact of SR for the metaphysics of persistence (see note 1) must eventually be extended to the general 
relativistic context.  Although Minkowski spacetime is a good approximation of most of the spacetime of 
our world, it is, in the end, just that: an approximation.  Still, metaphysical implications of such an 
approximation are valuable, and there is a long tradition of debating them; e.g., the Putnam-Stein debate 
continuing to the present day. 
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innocent, instance of a more general problem afflicting the many-place relation of 
coexistence in the relativistic world of enduring objects.  Two more harmful 
manifestations of this problem are contextuality and chronological incoherence.  They 
strike at the very heart of the endurantist ontology, the notion of being wholly present at a 
single moment of time (in a given reference frame).  The perdurantist, on the other hand, 
is free to interpret the peculiar consequences of the coexistence relation in the Minkowski 
world as merely perspectival features of its intrinsic geometry.  I conclude that 
perdurantism remains a preferred theory of persistence in the relativistic context.12 
 
 
Appendix: Proof of FACT 
 
Consider a set of points O1, … On in Minkowski spacetime.  For all i ≠ j, Oi and Oj are 
spacelike separated.  Prove that there is a continuous spacelike 3D surface13 containing 
O1, … On. 
 
Def.:  A function f on a metric space X is K-Lipschitzian just in case ∃K > 0 such 
that for all x,x′ ∈ X, f(x) – f(x′) ≤ Kd(x,x′). 
Lemma:  If functions f1, … fn on X are K-Lipschitzian, then their lower 
bound 
ni
iff
...1
inf
=
≡  is K-Lipschitzian. 
Proof of Lemma, by induction: 
1.  Base step.  Assume f1 and f2 are K-Lipschitzian.  Fix two points x and y.  Let g 
≡ inf (f1,f2).  We have: 
 
–Kd(x,y) ≤ f1(x) – f1(y) ≤ Kd(x,y)     (1) 
–Kd(x,y) ≤ f2(x) – f2(y) ≤ Kd(x,y)     (2) 
 
Suppose f1(x) ≤  f2(x).  (Otherwise exchange f1 and f2.)  Then g(x) = f1(x).  
Consider two cases: (a) f1(y) ≤ f2(y) and (b) f1(y) > f2(y). 
(a) If f1(y) ≤ f2(y) then g(y) = f1(y) and, from (1): –Kd(x,y) ≤ g(x) – g(y) ≤ Kd(x,y). 
(b) If f1(y) > f2(y) then g(y) = f2(y).  From (1): g(y) = f2(y) < f1(y) ≤ f1(x) + Kd(x,y) 
= g(x) + Kd(x,y). 
Therefore, g(y) – g(x) < Kd(x,y). 
 
12 I am indebted to Cody Gilmore and Dean Zimmerman for comments on earlier drafts.  Special 
thanks are due to a referee for this Journal for very constructive criticism and many helpful suggestions.  
Finally, I thank my son Alex Balashov for a crash course on StarTrek. 
13 For our purposes, a surface is spacelike just in case any two points on it are spacelike separated; 
we do not require differentiability.  But we shall accept, without proof, that if a sought-for continuous, but 
perhaps ‘corrugated’, surface is available, it can always be appropriately ‘smoothened’ and be made 
everywhere differentiable, thus becoming, in a technical sense, a hypersurface. 
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From (2): g(y) = f2(y) ≥ f2(x) – Kd(x,y) ≥ f1(x) – Kd(x,y) = g(x) – Kd(x,y). 
Therefore, g(y) – g(x) ≥ –Kd(x,y). 
2.  Inductive step.  Assume:  If functions f1, … fn on X are K-Lipschitzian, then 
ni
iff
...1
inf
=
≡  is K-Lipschitzian.  Show: If functions f1, … fn+1 on X are K-Lipschitzian, then 
1...1
inf
+=
≡
ni
iff  is K-Lipschitzian. 
Denote: 
ni
ifg
...1
inf
=
≡ .  By assumption, g is K-Lipschitzian.  Note that 
),(infinf 1
1...1
+
+=
= n
ni
i fgf .  Apply the result of the base step to g and fn+1. ■ 
 
Main proof.  Pick a frame.  Set c = 1.  We are looking for a continuous real 
function F on X satisfying F(x) – F(y) < d(x,y) for all distinct x and y and such that 
F(xi) = ti, i = 1, … n. 
Let 
),(
min
1
1
ji
ji
ji
nj
ni xxd
tt
K
−=
≠≤≤
≤≤  and ),()( iii xxKdtxF +≡ .  Obviously K < 1.  Define 
ni
iFF
...1
inf
=
≡ . 
By the triangle inequality, ),(),(),()()( yxKdyyKdxxKdyFxF iiii ≤−=− .  
Therefore all Fi(x) are K-Lipschitzian.  By Lemma, F(x) is K-Lipschitzian.  Hence F(x) is 
continuous and F(x) – F(y) < Kd(x,y).  Since K < 1, this entails, for all distinct x and y, 
F(x) – F(y) < d(x,y). 
It remains to show that F(xi) = ti,  i = 1, … n.  First, note that iii txF =)( .  Next, 
for all j ≠ i, iij txF ≥)( .  Hence ii
nj
ji txFxF =≡
=
)(inf)(
...1
.14 ■ 
 
14 The proof strategy and the choice of F are due to Tom Goodwillie.  I was also greatly helped by 
Valery Alexeev who patiently educated me on Lipschitzian functions.  I am grateful to both of them. 
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